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ROBERT C. BRIGHTON, JR.*
On July 30, 2002, in response to widespread concern about corporate
governance excesses and financial fraud, United States President, George W.
Bush, signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Act"),' a bill effect-
ing the greatest change in United States regulation of the securities markets
since the original adoption of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").
Two years after the collapse of Enron, complaints regarding the damag-
ing effect on corporate growth of the Act spawned by Enron can be plain-
tively heard. However, continuing corporate scandals involving household
name companies, including the Italian food giant Parmalat, and the health
services company, HealthSouth, have kept the issue of corporate accountabil-
ity prominently before the public.
In fact, in response to scandals involving the New York Stock Exchange
and several prominent mutual funds, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC") and other regulators and law enforcement officials have called
for additional regulation of the securities markets.
OVERVIEW OF THE ACT
The focus of the Act and this article is the regulation of the accounting
profession and of the auditing and financial reporting process of public com-
panies. For this purpose, a public company is a company, the securities of
which is registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, or which is re-
quired to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, or that files,
* Robert C. Brighton, Jr. chairs Ruden McClosky's Securities Law Practice Group.
His practice focuses on general corporate and securities law, and merger and acquisitions. He
frequently advises public and private companies and financial institutions on corporate finance
and securities law issues, including corporate governance issues. He can be reached at (954)
527-2473 and robert.brighton@ruden.com.
1. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
2. See Floyd Norris, Too Much Regulation? Corporate Bosses Sing the Sarbanes-Oxley
Blues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at Cl. According to a survey of global chief executives
released by PricewaterhouseCoopers at the World Economic Forum, fifty-nine percent of
global chief executives surveyed viewed overregulation as a significant risk and more of a
threat to corporate growth than global terrorism or currency fluctuations. See id.
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or has filed a registration statement that has not yet become effective under
the Securities Act. In addition, the Act also significantly regulates the corpo-
rate functions of public companies, particularly regarding corporate govern-
ance, as well as their executives, directors, and outside advisers. Accord-
ingly, this article also discusses the more significant aspects of the Act's im-
pact on these individuals.
The Act affects:
" public companies, by subjecting them to enhanced disclosure require-
ments and requiring them to adopt strict corporate governance standards;
" officers and directors of public companies, by requiring them to certify
their company's annual and quarterly reports (including, specifically, the
financial statements), return profits and bonuses relating to false financial
statements and forego loans to them by the company, except in limited cir-
cumstances;
" auditors of public companies, by requiring them to register and be sub-
ject to regulation by a newly-created independent audit review board, and
by placing additional restrictions on their ability to perform non-audit ser-
vices to their audit clients;
" employees of public companies, by insulating them from retaliation for
reporting questionable corporate activities;
" securities lawyers who represent public companies, by requiring them
to report to the company's CEO or general counsel, or qualified legal
compliance committee, and in some cases, the board of directors, evidence
of material violations of securities laws or breaches of fiduciary duty; and
" investment banks employed by public companies and the research
analysts who are employed by investment banks to follow public compa-
nies for investment banks, by subjecting them to increased regulation re-
garding conflicts of interest between analysts and the banking arm of the
investment banks, including increased disclosure of actual and potential
conflicts of interest.
The Act also added and increased criminal penalties for certain viola-
tions of the U.S. securities laws and increased the statutes of limitation for
certain existing private rights of action for violations of certain existing secu-
rities laws.
The Act is part of an enhancement of the public company regulatory re-
gime that includes rulemaking by the SEC, other SEC initiatives, changes in
stock exchange listing standards and actions by private groups, such as the
Financial Accounting Standards Board and the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants, and stricter regulation and enforcement by the secu-
[Vol. 28:3:605
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rities law administrators of the individual states. The Act contemplates that
the SEC and the stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") and the Nasdaq Stock Market ("Nasdaq"), will implement their
provisions through rules adopted by them. In some cases, the Act provides
significant discretion to these regulators as to how its provisions may be im-
plemented. In other cases, the Act requires specific acts of compliance.
Some of the provisions of the Act are immediately effective. However,
in the case of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Board
was not required to become fully functional until April 26, 2003, and audi-
tors were not required to register with the Board until 180 days afterward.3
And in the case of the requirement to file internal control reports with com-
pany annual reports, the requirement becomes effective in 2004 for larger
U.S. companies and in 2005 for other U.S. companies and for non-U.S. SEC-
reporting companies.
In some cases, the Act required expedited rulemaking and implementa-
tion of the Act's requirements. For example, the SEC was required to, and
did, adopt regulations regarding the accelerated reporting requirements for
public company insiders that became effective on August 29, 2002.
The breadth and depth of the regulatory changes effected by the Act,
and the unknown impact of existing and future rulemaking and interpreta-
tion, make the Act's practical requirements and effect difficult to currently
evaluate. Moreover, it is unclear at this time what additional exemptions the
SEC may adopt to, or alternative versions of, the Act's requirements insofar
as they relate to non-U.S. persons and small business issuers.
What follows is a brief summary of the more significant general provi-
sions of the Act. It is not intended to be comprehensive and should not be
relied upon as legal advice. Moreover, it generally only reflects develop-
ments through August 2003.
THE ACT'S EFFECT ON PUBLIC COMPANIES
"Real Time'" Disclosure Requirements
The Act accelerates a public company's reporting obligations by requir-
ing "real time" "plain English" disclosure of material changes in the financial
condition or operations of a public company.4 The Act suggests that such
3. See Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certifi-
cation of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003).
4. See Section 409 of the Act which amended the Exchange Act by adding a new para-
graph (1) to Section 13 thereof as follows:
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disclosure may include trend and qualitative information and graphic presen-
tations. These disclosures would require subjective determinations by the
issuer regarding the materiality of agreements, reduction in revenues from
major customers, material direct or contingent financial obligations and ma-
terial write-offs and impairments. Under the final Rule amending Form 8-K
disclosure requirements and deadlines, these judgments, are required to be
made within the constraints of a four-business day filing requirement. There
are significant consequences for inaccurate or late filings (though the final
Rule ameliorates some of those consequences if appropriate disclosure is
made by the time of the next required periodic report under the Exchange
Act). Compliance with these requirements promises to pose significant chal-
lenges for U.S. public companies.5
This requirement is a significant departure from existing U.S. law. Pre-
viously, companies had broad latitude in the timing of the disclosure of mate-
rial corporate developments so long as insiders were not trading on the basis
of their knowledge. Although not part of the Act, the SEC has also acceler-
ated the filing date requirements for annual reports on Form 10-K and quar-
terly reports on Form I0-Q. These requirements will be phased-in over three
years and do not apply to small business issuers or companies with less than
$75 million in public float.
Management Report on Internal Controls
The Act requires management to establish an internal control structure.
Management is also required to prepare a report, to be included in the com-
pany's annual report, which assesses the effectiveness of these controls and
procedures on the company's financial reporting for the past year. The com-
"(1) REAL TIME DISCLOSURES. Each issuer reporting under section 13(a) or 15(d)
shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional information concerning
material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer, in plain English, which
may include trend and qualitative information and graphic presentations, as the Commission
determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of investors and in the public in-
terest."
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 409, 116 Stat. at 791.
5. See additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,
Release Nos. 33-8400 and 34-49424 (March 16, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules
/final/33-8400 (last visited April 8, 2004). The Final Rules expand the list of disclosure items
under Form 8-K (adding, among others, disclosure regarding 1) material agreements, 2) mate-
rial financial obligations, 3) sales of unregistered securities, 4) material modifications to the
rights of securities holders and 5) actions to delist the company's securities from a national
securities exchange or SRO) and shorten the filing deadline for most Form 8-K items to four
business days. The expanded disclosure and accelerated reporting requirements are effective
as of August 23, 2004 and will operate prospectively only.
[Vol. 28:3:605
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pany's outside auditors that prepare its audit report must attest to, and report
on, management's internal control assessment. The SEC has adopted rules
providing details regarding the content of the report. These reports are re-
quired to be included in a public company's annual report on Form 10-K, 20-
F, or 40-F, as applicable, beginning with the annual report for its first fiscal
year ending on or after June 15, 2004 for accelerated filers; and April 16,
2005 in the case of other U.S. companies and all non-U.S. SEC reporting
companies.
This requirement will likely cause senior officers of public companies
and their significant subsidiaries of public companies to assume greater re-
sponsibility for the accuracy of the financial reports generated by the busi-
ness operations under their management.
Use of Pro Forma Financial Information
The Act addresses some of the perceived abuses relating to the use of
pro forma financial information. It does this by requiring that pro forma
financial information, whether appearing in a company's SEC reports or in a
company press release or other public disclosure:
" comply with the U.S. federal securities law's standard for accuracy and
completeness (that is, the disclosure does not contain an untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the dis-
closure not misleading); and
" include a reconciliation with the company's financial statements prepared
in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principals
("GAAP").
The SEC has adopted Regulation G,6 which governs the use of non-
GAAP financial measures in all public disclosures, including earnings re-
leases containing non-GAAP financial measures. Under Regulation G, a
non-GAAP financial measure is a numerical measure of a company's past or
future financial performance, financial position or cash flows that:
* excludes amounts, or is subject to adjustments that have the effect of ex-
cluding amounts, that are included in the most directly comparable meas-
ure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP; or
6. See Conditions for Use of non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed Reg. 4820 (Jan.
30, 2003).
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* includes amounts, or is subject to adjustments that have the effect of ex-
cluding amounts, that are excluded from the most directly comparable
measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP.
Regulation G requires that when a company makes a public disclosure
that includes material non-GAAP financial information, it must include a
presentation of the "most directly comparable" financial measure calculated
and presented in accordance with GAAP and a reconciliation of the differ-
ences between the non-GAAP financial measure with the "most directly
comparable" financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with
GAAP.
Other Financial Information Requirements
In a requirement of potentially far-reaching consequence, the Act re-
quires public companies to provide in each annual and quarterly SEC filing
disclosure of all material that may have a material current or future effect on
the company's (i) financial condition, (ii) changes in financial condition, (iii)
results of operations, (iv) liquidity, (v) capital expenditures, (vi) capital re-
sources, or (vii) significant components of revenues or expenses, including:
* off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including con-
tingent obligations); and
* other relationships of the company with unconsolidated entities or other
persons.
Audit Committees
The Act requires all audit committee members to be independent. The
Act also requires companies to grant their audit committee authority over the
selection, compensation, and oversight of outside auditors. Compounding
the difficulty of complying, the Act sets a stricter standard for determining
independence. A person is considered "independent" only if he does not
receive any consulting or similar fees from, and is not affiliated with, the
company or any of its subsidiaries, other than in his capacity as a director.
In addition, the Act requires public companies to disclose whether or
not its audit committee has at least one member who is a "financial expert,"
and, if not, an explanation of why not. The SEC has defined "financial ex-
pert" in its rulemaking as a person who has the following attributes:
[Vol. 28:3:605
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(i) An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles
and financial statements;
(ii) The ability to assess the general application of such principles
in connection with the accounting for estimates accruals and re-
serves;
(iii) Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing, or evaluating fi-
nancial statements that present a breadth and level of complexity
of accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth
and complexity of issues that can reasonable be expected to be
raised by the registrant's financial statements, or experience ac-
tively supervising one or more person engaged in such activities;
(iv) An understanding of internal controls and procedures for fi-
nancial reporting; and
(v) An understanding of audit committee functions. 7
Under the Act, the SEC has directed the national securities exchanges
(that is, the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) to prohibit the listing of the securi-
ties of companies that do not have an audit committee that complies with the
requirements of the Act.
Both the NYSE and Nasdaq have adopted rules relating to corporate
governance standards that in some respects are stricter than the standards
included in the Act. For example, both the NYSE and Nasdaq rules require
that the nominating and compensation committees of public companies con-
sist solely of independent directors. Moreover, to empower non-
management directors, the rules of both NYSE and Nasdaq require non-
management directors to meet regularly and participate more directly in ap-
proval of related party transactions, the nomination of directors, and the de-
termination of CEO compensation.
Enhanced SEC Review of Periodic Reports and Enforcement Powers
The Act requires the SEC to review disclosures, including financial dis-
closure, made by public companies that have a class of securities listed on a
national securities exchange or Nasdaq "on a regular and systematic basis"
and, in any case, at least once every three years. This provision of the Act is
intended expressly to include review of the periodic filings of non-U.S. com-
panies.
The Act gives the SEC and the U.S. federal courts additional enforce-
ment and injunctive powers. For example, the SEC now has the power to
impose a forty-five-day freeze (which can be extended in some circum-
7. See Instruction to paragraph (h)(I) of Item 401 of Regulation S-K.
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stances) on extraordinary payments to a company's directors, officers, agents
or employees by a company that is under investigation.
In addition, the Act amends current law to permit a court, in an action
brought by the SEC, to prohibit a person who violates the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws from acting as an officer or director of a public
company when the conduct indicates the "unfitness," versus the current stan-
dard of "substantial unfitness," to serve as an officer or director. The SEC
may also issue orders to such effect in some circumstances.
THE ACT'S EFFECT ON DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Certifications of Periodic Reports
Under the Act, the chief executive and chief financial officers of public
companies must comply with two separate certification requirements with
respect to their company's periodic reports filed with the SEC. The Act does
not indicate, and the SEC has provided no guidance as to, whether the two
separate certification requirements can be satisfied by use of one certifica-
tion. In addition, the NYSE's corporate governance rules require CEOs of
NYSE-listed companies to certify annually to the SEC as to their company's
compliance with NYSE corporate governance listing standards.
In the certification required by Section 906 of the Act, chief executive
officers and chief financial officers must certify in a written statement ac-
companying the filing of their company's period reports that:
" such periodic report "fully complies" with the requirements of Section
13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
* the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all mate-
rial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the com-
pany.
These certifications may not be qualified as being to the knowledge of
the officer giving the certifications. However, the officer is only subject to
criminal penalties when the officer has knowledge of the non-compliance.
The Act provides no guidance on what it means for the certification to "ac-
company" the report. The approach most commonly used to date has been to
file the certification as an exhibit to the report. Another approach is to file
the certification in a non-public EDGAR (the SEC's electronic filing system
for public companies) correspondence format along with the report, and to
concurrently file the certification with the SEC on a current report (Form 8-K
for domestic companies; Form 6-K for foreign private issuers).
[Vol. 28:3:605
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The Act makes it a federal crime, punishable by imprisonment, to make
a false certification. An officer who certifies that a report complies while
"knowing" that the report in fact does not comply, can be fined up to $1 mil-
lion or imprisoned up to 10 years. If this false certification is made "will-
fully," the officer may be fined up to $5 million and imprisoned for up to 20
years, or both. The Act does not address the consequences of failing to file
the certification or filing a certification that does not comply with the Act.
In addition, under Section 302 of the Act, pursuant to rules adopted by
the SEC and effective August 29, 2002, a public company's principal execu-
tive officer and principal financial officer must certify the contents of the
company's quarterly and annual reports. The certification must provide that
the officer has:
" reviewed the report;
" based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in or-
der to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances in which
they were made, not misleading;
" the officer and the other certifying officers of the company:
o are responsible for establishing and maintaining "disclosure
controls and procedures" for the company;
o have designed such disclosure controls and procedures to en-
sure that material information is made known to them;
o have evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure
controls and procedures within 90 days of the date of the re-
port; and
o have presented in the report their conclusions about the effec-
tiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on
their evaluation;
* the officer and other certifying officers have disclosed to the company's
auditors and to the audit committee of the board:
o all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of inter-
nal controls which could adversely affect the company's abil-
ity to record, process, summarize and report financial data,
and have identified for the company's auditors any material
weaknesses in internal controls; and
o any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the com-
pany's internal controls; and
" the officer and other certifying officers have indicated in the report
whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in
9
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other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to
the date of their evaluation, including any corrective actions with respect
to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
In connection with the adoption of Section 404 of the Act's rules con-
cerning management reports on internal controls and related auditor's attesta-
tion reports, the SEC amended the required certification regarding the ade-
quacy of disclosure controls and procedures. This certification requires the
evaluation of disclosure controls as of the end of the period covered by the
registrant's report under the Exchange Act. Moreover, the final rules
adopted by the SEC make clear that the certification relates to an evaluation,
not only of the issuer but also of its consolidated subsidiaries.8
Code of Ethics
Pursuant to the Act, the SEC adopted rules requiring all public compa-
nies, including non-U.S. companies, to disclose in their periodic reports
whether they have adopted a code of ethics for their senior financial officers.
The final rules, as adopted, extended this requirement to the issuer's princi-
pal executive officer, as well as its principal financial officer and principal
accounting officer or controller or officer with similar functions. If the com-
pany has not adopted a code, it is required to disclose the reasons why it has
not adopted a code, thus placing an onus on any company that fails to adopt a
code of ethics. Moreover, the Act requires a public company to immediately
disclose any change or waiver of any provision of a code of ethics for any
principal executive officer or senior financial officers on Form 8-K, or by
dissemination on the Internet or other electronic means.
In addition, the NYSE's and Nasdaq's corporate governance rules ex-
pand the requirements of the Act. These proposals contemplate the manda-
tory adoption of a code of ethics. These codes of ethics govern the conduct
of all directors, officers and employees of public companies listed on the
NYSE or Nasdaq and promptly disclose any waivers of the code for directors
and executive officers. Non-U.S. companies are exempt from the NYSE rule
and are also probably exempt from the Nasdaq requirement.
8. See Item 601 (b)(31) of Regulation S-K.
[Vol. 28:3:605
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Disgorgement of Bonuses and Profits
Under the Act, if the material noncompliance of the company with the
financial reporting requirements of the securities laws results from "miscon-
duct:"
* the Act "requires" a public company to restate its financials; and
" the CEO and CFO of the company must reimburse the company for any
bonus or other incentive or equity-based compensation received by the of-
ficer from the company during the twelve-month period following the first
public issuance or filing with the SEC of the financial information, as well
as any profits realized from the sale of securities of the company during
such period.
However, the Act does not provide any guidance regarding:
" how to determine whether the restatement resulted from the misconduct
(or what constitutes "misconduct"), or whose misconduct is relevant; or
" when such restatements are "required," as opposed to when they are dis-
cretionary by the company.
Companies and commentators are seeking clarification of these re-
quirements from the SEC.
The SEC has the authority to exempt any person from these provisions
and non-U.S. companies are expected to lobby to obtain exemptions for their
officers.
Prohibition on Personal Loans to Directors and Executive Officers
The Act makes it unlawful for any company, directly or indirectly, in-
cluding through a subsidiary, "to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the
extension of credit, or to renew any extension of credit, in the form of a per-
sonal loan to or for any director or executive officer (or the equivalent
thereof)" of the company. Although most types of loans that have histori-
cally been made to management are now prohibited, the Act grandfathers
extensions of credit in place on the date of adoption of the Act (but not mate-
rial modifications thereto or renewals thereof). Among others, the Act pro-
hibits companies from making officer relocation loans and loans to officers
to enable them to purchase company equity. The application of the prohibi-
tion to some compensation arrangements (such as split dollar insurance poli-
cies) is currently unclear.
11
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Although many questions remain, some practitioners have focused on
the language of Section 402 of the Act and suggested that the prohibitions of
the Section apply only to transactions that meet two separate requirements:
* the transaction must take the form of a loan, and not merely be an exten-
sion of credit (such as an advance of funds for indemnification, or where
the intent is to confer a compensation benefit such as a tax indemnity pay-
ment); and
• the loan must be a "personal loan."
Under this view, a loan is not a "personal loan" if the primary purpose
of the loan is to advance the business of the company. This would exclude
business travel advances and use of company credit cards and company cars.
Under this view the following transactions would be permitted:
* travel and similar advances;
" personal use of a company credit card, if the individual is required to repay
within a reasonable period of time after the charges have been presented;
" personal use of a company car, if limited and ancillary to business use and
reimbursement is required to be settled within a reasonable period of time;
" relocation payments (treated the same as travel since primarily for a busi-
ness purpose);
" "stay" and "retention" bonuses subject to repayment, if they must be re-
paid and they are contingent upon employment or a similar condition;
" indemnification advances;
" deferred compensation in which an executive officer makes an "invest-
ment" (through deferring compensation) in an index or notational assets
with terms giving them a favorable return;
" tax indemnity for payments to overseas-based executive officers;
* loans from 401(k) plans;
" loans from annuities and other broad-based employee benefit plans; and
" "cashless" option exercises.
Acceleration of Section 16 Reporting Obligations
The Act amends the Exchange Act to require directors, officers, and ten
percent shareholders to disclose any change in their ownership of equity se-
curities before the end of the second business day following the day on
which the change in ownership occurs. The SEC has modified this deadline
[Vol. 28:3:605
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in the case of certain transactions where the insider does not select the date
of execution of the transaction resulting in the ownership change such as:
" transactions pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 (c) plans (which provide a safe harbor
from the antifraud provisions of Rule 10b5 under the Exchange Act) that
provide for purchases and sales triggered by the occurrence of certain
events; and
" specified transactions under employee benefit plans, such as fund-
switching transactions.
The Act also requires that insiders file electronically with the SEC the
forms disclosing changes in ownership within one year of the effective date
of the Act. The SEC is required to publish such statements on an Internet
accessible site no later than the end of the business day following the filing
and companies are required to put the statements on their corporate websites,
if they have one.
Improper Influence on Conduct of the Audit
The SEC has adopted rules making it unlawful for any officer or direc-
tor of a public company to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or
mislead any accountant for the purpose of rendering a company's financial
statements materially misleading. Rule 13b2-2 prohibits officers and direc-
tors of an issuer, and persons acting under their direction, from directly or
indirectly taking any action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently
influence any independent public or certified public accountant engaged in
the performance of an audit or review of the financial statements of that is-
suer that are required to be filed with the SEC if they knew or should have
known that such action, if successful, could result in rendering the issuer's
financial statements materially misleading. In the case of registered invest-
ment companies, the rule also covers officers and directors of the investment
advisor to the investment company and an investment company's sponsor,
depositor, trustee, and administrator.
Restrictions on Trades During Pension Plan Blackout Periods
The Act prohibits directors and executive officers from purchasing, sell-
ing, or otherwise acquiring or transferring any equity security acquired as
part of their compensation during a "blackout period." A "blackout period"
is a period designated by the company and applicable to not less than fifty
percent of the participants or beneficiaries in plans maintained by the com-
pany that prohibits trades during a period of more than three consecutive
13
Brighton: Sarbanes-Oxley: A Primer for Public Companies, and Their Officers
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA WREVIEW
business days. The profits from any transactions made in violation of this
prohibition must be paid to the company. The Act provides a private right of
action to compel such payment or, if the company fails to bring suit within
60 days of a request, by a securityholder in the name of the company. Com-
panies must provide notice of blackout periods to the SEC, as well as to offi-
cers and directors of the company.
The Department of Labor will likely take additional regulatory action,
pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), that will require companies to provide notice to employees of
blackouts and may also prohibit discriminatory exercises by executives dur-
ing a blackout period.
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUDITORS
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
Under the Act, the SEC has established a five-member Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("Board"). The initial Board was appointed in
October, 2002. The SEC retroactively approved the Board's by-laws effec-
tive January 2003. (These by-laws were adopted by the Board on January 9,
2003 and amended on April 25, 2003.) Three of the Board's members must
be non-accountants and two members must be or have been certified public
accountants. All members must be "prominent individuals of integrity and
reputation." The SEC approved William J. McDonough, the former presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be chairman in May 2003.
Mr. McDonough's appointment followed the resignation of William H.
Webster as a result of concerns about his role as an audit committee member
of a financially troubled company.
The Board's jurisdiction extends to registered public accounting firms
and their associated persons. The Board does not regulate accounting firms
that perform services only for private companies.
The primary purpose of the Board is to:
* register public accounting firms;
* establish or adopt auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other
standings relating to the preparation of audit reports;
" conduct inspections of registered public accounting firms;
" conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings concerning registered
public accounting firms and associated persons; and
* enforce compliance with the Act, the Board's rules, professional stan-
dards, and the securities laws relating to the preparation of audit reports by
registered public accounting firms and associated persons.
[Vol. 28:3:605
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 8
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/8
2004] SARBANES-OXLEY. A PRIMER FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES 619
The Board members are authorized to propose rules and adopt auditing
and other professional standards subject to the approval and oversight of the
SEC.
Mandatory Registration with the Board
Every public accounting firm that prepares or issues, or participates in
the preparation or issuance of, any audit report with respect to any public
company must be registered with the Board. This requirement means that
any accounting firm that participates in the audit of a public company or one
of its consolidated subsidiaries must be registered. Mandatory registration
becomes effective 180 days after the date that the SEC determines that the
Board is capable of carrying out its obligations (which occurred on April 25,
2003). Non-U.S. public accounting firms that participate in audits of U.S. or
non-U.S. Sec reporting companies were granted an 180-day grace period and
must register by April 19, 2004.
The Board has developed a form application for registration. The regis-
tration application includes a "consent" to cooperation in and compliance
with any request for testimony or production of documents made by the
Board. The application also includes an agreement to secure similar con-
sents from each of the firm's "associated persons."
Although non-U.S. accounting firms are generally subject to the same
requirements as their U.S. counterparts, the Board's rules permit a certain
narrowing of the scope of the disclosure required of non-U.S. public account-
ing firms in the registration process such as:
* a non-U.S. public accounting firm is permitted to limit disclosure to the
associated accountants with status as proprietor, partner, principal, share-
holder, officer or manager of the firm, as opposed to all accountants in the
case of U.S. firms, and who provided at least ten hours of audit services to
an issuer client during the last calendar year; and
* a non-U.S. public accounting firm is permitted to withhold from its appli-
cation information prohibited from disclosure under a non-U.S. law, by
submitting 1) a copy in English of the conflicting non-U.S. law, 2) a legal
opinion regarding the conflict, and 3) an explanation regarding the appli-
cant's efforts to eliminate the conflict by seeking consents or waivers, if
applicable.
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Auditing, Quality Control, Ethics and Independence Standards
The Board's auditing standards must include at least the following stan-
dards for all registered public accounting firms:
" the firm must retain for at least seven years audit work papers and other
information in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in the
audit report;
* the Board may require the retention of records (not otherwise required) for
purposes of Board inspections; and
" the firm must provide a concurring or second partner to review and ap-
prove each audit report and must describe in each audit report the scope of
the auditor's testing of the internal control structure and procedures of the
public company and present, in its report or a separate report, the firm's
findings from such testing, an evaluation of the internal control structure,
and a description of material weaknesses in such internal controls and cir-
cumstances or instance of noncompliance with the Board's rules and stan-
dards.
Inspections, Investigations and Disciplinary Procedures
The Act requires the Board to conduct a program of inspections to as-
sess compliance by each registered public accounting firm and its associated
persons with the Act, and SEC and Board rules, and professional standards.
Board inspections replace the existing "peer review" system and must be
conducted annually for each registered firm that regularly provides audit
reports for more than 100 issuers and less often for other firms. The results
of these inspections will be available for public review, subject to the protec-
tion of confidential and proprietary information. However, no portion of the
report that contains criticism or defects in quality control systems shall be
made public if the firm addresses these criticisms or defects within twelve
months after the date of the inspection report.
Except to the extent discussed above, non-U.S. accounting firms that
sign audit reports for any SEC registrant are fully subject to the Act. In addi-
tion, accounting firms, even if they do not issue audit reports, but nonetheless
play a substantial role in the preparation and furnishing of reports for particu-
lar public companies, are also required to register with the Board. This ap-
pears to require all firms that audit subsidiaries of public companies, includ-
ing non-U.S. accounting firms, to register with the Board.
(Vol. 28:3:605
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Auditor Independence
A primary focus of the Act is auditor independence. To ensure an audi-
tor's independence the Act prohibits a company's auditors from concurrently
providing certain specified categories of services while also providing audit
services to the company, whether or not approved by the company's audit
committee. These services are:
" bookkeeping;
" financial information systems design and implementation;
" appraisal or valuation services;
" fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports;
" actuarial services;
" internal audit outsourcing services;
" management or human resources services;
" broker or dealer, investment adviser or investment banking services;
" legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and
" expert services unrelated to the audit.
The Board is authorized to exempt companies or audit firms from these
prohibitions on a case-by-case basis. Such exemptions would probably be
restricted to situations where the discontinuation of an auditor's non-audit
services would result in extreme hardship to the company.
The Act permits a company's auditors to perform any other non-audit
services (such as "tax services," which could encompass a broad range of
services) for the company, but only if approved in advance by the company's
audit committee. More broadly, the Act requires a public company's audit
committee to pre-approve audit and non-audit engagements by firms that
provide audit services to the company and to disclose the approval in the
company's periodic reports filed with the SEC. Under Rule 2-01(3)(1) an
accountant is not independent unless either:
" before the accountant is engaged by the issuer or its subsidiaries to render
an audit or non-audit service, the engagement is approved by the issuer's
audit committee, or
* the engagement to render the service is entered into pursuant to pre-
approval policies and procedures established by the audit committee of the
issuer, subject to:
o the requirement that the policies and procedures must be de-
tailed as to the particular service;
o the audit committee is informed of each service; and
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o such policies and procedures do not include delegation of the
audit committee's responsibilities to management.
The pre-approval process extends also to audit and non-audit services
provided by accounting firms other than the issuer's principal auditor. The
audit committee has no required role, however, regarding non-audit services
provided by a firm that is not involved in the audit of the SEC-filed financial
statements.
Under the rules, issuers must also disclose aggregate fees billed by their
accountants for audit services, audit-related services, tax services, and all
other services for each of the last two fiscal years. In addition, the rules re-
quire issuers to disclosure the audit committee's pre-approval policies and
procedures.
Auditor Reports to Company Audit Committees
The Act requires auditors that perform an audit for a public company to
report to the company's audit committee:
" the "critical accounting policies" and practices to be used in the audit;
* all "alternative treatments" of financial information permitted by GAAP
that have been discussed with management officials, the ramifications of
the use of the "alternative disclosures" and the treatment preferred by the
audit firm; and
" any other material written communications between the audit firm and the
company's management, such as a management letter or schedule of unad-
justed differences.
Other Provisions of the Act Affecting Auditors
In addition, the Act requires the rotation of 1) the lead (or coordinating
audit) partner who has primary responsibility for the audit or 2) the audit
partner who reviews the audit every five years. The Act also prohibits an
audit firm from auditing a company if the company's CEO, controller, CFO,
CAO, or any person serving in an equivalent position was employed by the
auditor and participated in any capacity in the audit of the company within
one year prior to the date of the initiation of the audit.
The SEC has also adopted rules under the Act regarding audit partner
rotation, reports to audit committees and the cooling-off period requirements,
and a rule relating to compensation of audit partners not mandated by the
Act. These rules:
[Vol. 28:3:605
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" require rotation of certain audit partners after five or seven years, depend-
ing on the partner's role in the audit engagement;
" prohibit compensation of audit partners based upon procuring non-audit
services for audit clients;
" require a one-year cooling-off period prior to employment by an issuer of
certain former members of the accountant's audit engagement team; and
" mandate that auditors and audit committees communicate about critical
accounting policies and alternative GAAP treatment for material items.
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
The Act protects employees of a public company who assist or partici-
pate in investigations by U.S. enforcement or regulatory authorities of certain
fraud-related activities. The Act provides for the payment of compensatory
and special damages to such employees and makes it a crime, punishable by
fine and up to ten years of imprisonment to retaliate against an employee
who provides truthful information to a law enforcement officer relating to the
commission or possible commission of a federal offense.
ATTORNEY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Act requires attorneys, including in-house and outside counsel, to
report evidence of corporate wrongdoing to the boards of directors of the
companies that they represent. Specifically, the Act requires attorneys to
report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduci-
ary duty to the company's general counsel or chief executive officer. If the
general counsel or CEO does not respond appropriately to the evidence, the
attorney must present the evidence to the company's board of directors, or
audit committee or other committee of the board of directors comprised
solely of directors who are not members of the issuer's management.
The SEC has adopted rules to implement Section 307's requirement for
the establishment of minimum standards of professional conduct for attor-
neys practicing before the SEC in the representation of issuers. These rules
go beyond the requirements of Section 307 and are arguably the most con-
troversial of all provisions adopted by the SEC to implement the Act.
The rules require covered attorneys who become aware of "credible
evidence" of a "material violation" on the part of the issuer or its agent to
report such evidence "up-the-ladder" within the issuer and to determine
whether an "appropriate response" has been undertaken. The final rules ex-
clude, the controversial requirement of "noisy withdrawal" from representa-
tion of the issuer and notification of the SEC if the issuer has not appropri-
ately responded to the attorney's report of the issuer's violation and permit
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the report of the perceived violation to a qualified legal compliance commit-
tee, if established by the issuer, as an alternative to "up-the-ladder reporting".
However, simultaneously with the adoption of the final rules, the SEC pro-
posed an alternative withdrawal and notification procedure that would re-
quire a covered attorney faced with "credible evidence" of a "material viola-
tion" to withdraw and notify the issuer. The issuer would be required to dis-
close the withdrawal and attendant "circumstances" to the SEC within two
business days on Form 8-K, 20-F or 40-F, as applicable.
The rules for the most part do not apply to non-U.S. attorneys and non-
practicing attorneys.
OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
Lengthening of Statute ofLimitations for Private Securities Fraud Actions
The Act extends the statute of limitations for private securities law
fraud actions to the earlier of two years (from one year) after the date of dis-
covery of the facts constituting the violation, or five years (from three years)
after the violation itself.
Securities Fraud Debt Not Dischargeable in Bankruptcy
The Act effects a change in U.S. bankruptcy law by providing that debts
incurred in violation of securities fraud laws, or as part of a common law
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, and that result
from a judgment, settlement, or other resolution of a judicial or administra-
tive proceeding, are no longer dischargeable in a U.S. bankruptcy proceed-
ing.
New Criminal Penalties
The Act makes it a crime under federal law to commit securities fraud
involving a public company. The Act provides for fines or imprisonment or
both for any person that knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a
scheme or artifice (i) to defraud any person in connection with any security
of a public company or (ii) to obtain by means of false pretenses, any money
or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any security of a pub-
lic company.
The Act also makes it a crime to destroy records in any federal investi-
gation or bankruptcy. The Act states that "whoever knowingly alters, de-
stroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any
record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct or
[Vol. 28:3:605
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influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case
filed under" the bankruptcy code, will be fined or imprisoned for not more
than twenty years or both.
Increased Federal Criminal Penalties
The Act increases the penalties for a "willful" violation by an individual
of the Exchange Act from a fine of up to $1 million to a fine of up to $5 mil-
lion, and from imprisonment of up to ten years to imprisonment up to twenty
years. The maximum fine for entities is increased from $2.5 million to $25
million.
The Act also increases the penalties for mail fraud and wire fraud from
a maximum of five years imprisonment to a maximum of twenty years im-
prisonment. In addition, the Act increases criminal penalties for violations of
ERISA from one year to ten years imprisonment, with additional increases in
the fines permitted.
Moreover, the Act extends these same penalties to persons who attempt
or conspire to commit an offense such as wire fraud, mail fraud, and securi-
ties fraud.
Disgorgement Fund
Section 308 of the Act authorizes the SEC to establish a disgorgement
fund using the civil monetary penalties and settlements in enforcement ac-
tions for securities law violations for the benefit of the victims of those viola-
tions.
Although the effective date of this provision is July 30, 2002, the SEC
has interpreted the Section's provisions to be applicable based on the date
that the funds are received. For example, the SEC has applied the $500 mil-
lion cash and $250 million stock settlement received as a civil penalty from
WorldCom in connection with the settlement approved by the court on July
7, 2003 of an action brought relating to the company's accounting fraud, an
event that pre-dated the enactment of the Act. The SEC has also announced
its intention to direct payments of $135 million and $125 million to be re-
ceived from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc., respectively, to the
disgorgement fund. These payments relate to settlement of claims brought
by the SEC for these banks' roles in several structured finance transactions
of Enron and Dynergy (in the case of Citigroup) that were allegedly used to
distort the companies' financial picture.
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Research Analysts
Section 501 of the Act addresses concerns about conflicts of interests
that may arise when securities analysts recommend equity securities in re-
search reports and public appearances and seeks to enhance the objectivity of
research and provide investors with more useful and reliable information.
The rules adopted by the self-regulatory agencies and approved by the
SEC impose a number of restrictions designed to limit the ability of member
firms to use research to obtain investment banking business and to reduce
conflicts of interest that research analysts may have, either because of the
firm's investment banking business or because of personal relationships that
the analyst may have with the companies covered by the analyst, including
those relating to securities ownership.
Rating Agencies
Section 702 of the Act requires the SEC to conduct a study of the role
and function of credit rating agencies in the operation of the securities mar-
kets. The study's scope includes six areas:
* the credit agencies' role in evaluating issuers;
* the importance of that role to investors and the markets;
* any impediments to accurate appraisals by the agencies;
* any entry barriers to the credit agency business and measures needed to
remove those barriers;
* measures to improve dissemination of rating agency appraisals of issuers;
and
* conflicts of interest in rating agency operations and ameliorative measures.
SUMMARY OF IMMEDIATE CONCERNS
For Companies and Their Management
CEO/CFO Certifications
* Non-U.S. companies should immediately begin the internal process to
support certifications and review and revise internal control systems as ap-
propriate
* U.S. companies may require officers of their subsidiaries and divi-
sions to certify to the financial controls and results as they relate to their lo-
cal operations
[Vol. 28:3:605
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Loans to Directors and Executive Officers
* Prohibitions on loans and extensions of credit will have an immediate ef-
fect on management of public companies and will make it more difficult to
attract and retain top management personnel
* Exceptions to the Act's prohibition mitigate this burden for banks and
other financial institutions
" The impact on routine corporate extensions of credit is still uncertain but it
seems likely not to prevent:
o travel and similar advances
o use of company credit cars
o use of company cars
o relocation payments
o "stay" and "retention" bonuses
o indemnification advances
o deferred compensation arrangements
o tax indemnity loans to overseas-based executives
o 401(k) plan loans
Whistleblower Protection
* Management will need to review their personnel policies for possible
changes.
Forfeiture of Bonus and Share Trading Profits
" CEOs and CFOs of public companies could be made to reimburse the
company for any bonus or other incentive-based compensation, as well as
profits from the sale of company securities, received during the twelve-
month period following initial publication of financial statements required
to be restated as the result of material noncompliance with financial re-
porting requirements due to misconduct.
Restrictions on Trades During Pension Plan Blackout Periods
* The prohibition on trades made during benefit plan "black-out" periods
may cause companies to revise plan procedures for their management.
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Audit Committees
" Members of audit committees must be "independent" as defined in the
Act, significantly restricting the ability of committee members to receive
compensation from the company or be affiliated in any manner with the
company; and
" The entire board of directors of public companies that do not have an audit
committee will be considered the audit committee and thus subject to these
restrictions.
"Real Time" Disclosure
" An expanded Form 8-K may be used by public companies to report sig-
nificant events on a current (four days after occurrence) basis;
* Trend and qualitative information may be required to be included in a
company's MD& A.
Internal Controls Disclosure
" Public companies must establish and maintain an adequate internal control
structure and financial reporting procedure
* Management will be subject, both directly and indirectly, to the require-
ment to prepare internal controls reports
Pro Forma Financial Information
" The Act requires companies reporting results on a pro forma basis to rec-
oncile these results with financial results prepared in accordance with
GAAP
Extension of Statute of Limitation for Private Securities Actions
" Investors now have two years after the disclosure of an alleged fraud or
five years after the violation itself to initiate a suit based on violation of
Rule 1 Ob-5 of the Exchange Act, rather than the one and three year limits
that previously applied.
[Vol. 28:3:605
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For Audit Firms
Auditor Oversight Board
" Audit firms that audit SEC-registered companies will be required to be
registered with the Board;
* The Board may require by rule the registration of accounting firms that
audit subsidiaries and divisions of public companies or which otherwise
play a "substantial role" in the audits of such companies;
* The Board will adopt and administer accounting rules that auditors that are
registered with the Board will be required to follow.
Auditor Independence and Rotation
" Audit firms that audit a public company will be prohibited from providing
specified non-audit services to the companies they audit, and may only
provide other services with the consent of the audit committee;
* Such firms will also be required to rotate audit partners;
" Audit partners may no longer be compensated based on the generation of
non-audit service-related business from audit clients;
* Public companies will be restricted from employing their former auditors
within one year of such individuals' involvement in auditing the company.
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